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Abstract 
Data privacy is an increasingly important issue in the world today. People are 
increasingly aware of, and concerned about, their digital footprint. As a result, 
many jurisdictions around the world—the United States excluded—have enacted 
legislation with an eye towards giving their citizens greater control over their 
data. However, the movement to give individuals greater control over how their 
data is used by tech providers often overlooks the fact that the government is 
one of the biggest consumers of the data that tech providers collect. Therefore, 
data privacy regimes that allow the flow of personal information to the 
government do not meaningfully protect individual privacy. As the people of the 
United States continue to debate how to best safeguard their personal 
information, they should be mindful of how law enforcement demand for their 
information can undermine those efforts. 
This note begins by observing how the current legal framework in the United 
States is ill equipped to deal with the privacy issues of an increasingly digital 
world. Then, it examines the impact that data privacy legislation in China and 
Europe has had on the relationship between tech companies and law 
enforcement. Finally, by applying the lessons learned in China and Europe, this 
note attempts to predict how efforts to protect consumers’ data privacy may 
work in the United States. Ultimately, this note argues that, because law 
enforcement in the United States is reliant on the data collected by the private 
sector, meaningful data privacy reform is likely impossible unless it applies to 
both the private sector and government equally. 
Outsourcing the Police 
41:213 (2021) 
215 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  Introduction ............................................................................................ 216 
II.  United States ......................................................................................... 217 
A. Privacy Law ............................................................................. 217 
B. Government Access to Personal Data ...................................... 218 
III.  Privacy and Law Enforcement Around the World .............................. 223 
A. Data Privacy Law in China and the European Union .............. 223 
B.  Government Access to Data in the EU and China ................... 228 
IV.  Private Providers and Government Surveillance ................................. 231 
V.  Conclusion ............................................................................................ 240 
Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business 41:213 (2021) 
216 
I. INTRODUCTION
All around the world, governments are trying to play catch up and
respond to the privacy implications of the swift expansion of an economy 
based on monetizing users’ personal data. Not only are more people than 
ever connected to one another, it is also a near impossibility for individuals 
to live in today’s world without their personal data being collected and used 
by a third party down the road. As a result, governments around the world 
have been compelled to amend or craft new law to give their citizens better 
control over how their data is used by third parties. At the same time, those 
same governments, also with the goal of protecting their citizens, are 
actively encroaching on the very same privacy interests to further their law 
enforcement and national security goals. 
Much of the current discussion regarding data privacy focuses on how 
tech providers such as Google and Facebook collect and monetize our data. 
The focus of this note is, instead, how law enforcement uses that data. As 
we will see, there is not necessarily a bright line separating the two spheres. 
An entire industry has emerged that monetizes personal data by selling law 
enforcement services to government. But, as a general matter, the recent 
trend of governments expanding personal data privacy protections is 
antithetical to the desires of law enforcement to get their hands on as much 
of that personal data as possible. 
At first glance, it may seem that the use of personal data by private 
actors in a commercial context is entirely separate from the government’s 
use of personal data. However, this note will argue that they are 
inextricably linked, and that modern law enforcement and government 
surveillance necessarily rely on the broad collection and processing of user 
data by private actors. As discussed below, this includes everything from 
social media to an individual’s shopping history. Just as individual people 
have come to rely on these things in their day to day lives, so have 
governments. In effect, private collection of user data is the faucet from 
which law enforcement drinks. 
This note will analyze the dynamic between the government’s attempts 
to protect the data privacy of its citizens from private actors while law 
enforcement agencies are simultaneously collecting as much of that same 
information as possible. This note will employ a comparative approach by 
contrasting different data privacy and surveillance schemes in the United 
States to the schemes in the European Union and China. 
Part II of this article will discuss in some detail the current privacy law 
in the United States and how it has enabled law enforcement to build an 
expansive surveillance framework. Part III examines current privacy law 
innovations in the European Union and China with an eye towards how that 
legislation can thwart government law enforcement goals. In Part VI, this 
article will examine the impact these different privacy schemes have on 
private tech providers. This article then concludes with a discussion of what 
Outsourcing the Police 
41:213 (2021) 
217 
impact privacy law will have going forward in this area. 
II. UNITED STATES
A. Privacy Law
The United States, unlike the European Union or even China, has not
enacted any broad data privacy legislation.1 Unfortunately, this means that 
understanding United States privacy law is not as simple as just looking up 
the relevant statute. Any discussion of the privacy law landscape in the 
United States necessarily requires a careful examination of the underlying 
case law and its history. To the extent statutory legal protection exists, it is 
in the form of sector-specific legislation that applies only to specific 
industries such as healthcare and financial services.2 The U.S. Constitution 
does not provide a fundamental right of data privacy; to the extent such a 
constitutional right exists in the United States it has developed through case 
law.3 
These privacy rights, where they do exist, are ill suited to deal with 
twenty-first century data privacy concerns. Privacy rights found in the U.S. 
Constitution are generally derived from the Fourth Amendment prohibition 
on “unreasonable searches and seizures” and place restrictions on state, not 
private, conduct.4 In the physical world, the scope of the protections offered 
by the Fourth Amendment are fairly easily defined and understood by 
applying an inside/outside test where the “entering [of] enclosed spaces 
ordinarily constitutes a search that triggers the Fourth Amendment.”5 
Alternatively, where a person is out in the open, where there is no 
“reasonable expectation of privacy,” the Fourth Amendment does not 
operate.6 
In the context of the internet and data stored electronically, the 
inside/outside test fails us.7 Further, much of our Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence fails to protect electronically stored data. The biggest factor is 
the “third-party doctrine,” the Fourth Amendment rule that a person forfeits 
their Fourth Amendment rights with regards to information that they 
disclose to a third party.8 The third-party doctrine has been roundly 
 1 Nicholas F. Palmieri III, Data Protection in an Increasingly Globalized World, 94 
IND. L.J. 297, 306 (2019). 
2 Id. at 323. 
3 Id. 
4 See Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General 
Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1017 (2010). 
5 Id. at 1010. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 1012. 
8 Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563 
(2009). 
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criticized by commentators and state Supreme Courts alike.9 A strict 
application of the third-party doctrine to the modern day leads to an absurd 
result: no person has a “reasonable expectation of privacy” for any 
information stored with a provider.10 This simply cannot be the case. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, since establishing the third-party doctrine in 
Smith v. Maryland,11 has shown some appetite for narrowing the scope of 
the doctrine as it applies to electronically stored data.12 To the extent that 
the pendulum has started to swing away from the third-party doctrine, the 
phenomenon is most on display in Carpenter v. United States. In 
Carpenter, the Court ruled that law enforcement needed a warrant in order 
to obtain a person’s cell site location information—information about the 
location of a cell phone each time it connects to a cell site—from the cell 
phone service provider.13 
The Fourth Amendment protections do not extend to a general right of 
privacy.14 The right to be “left alone” and free from intrusion into one’s 
personal affairs by other persons is left to the law of other states.15 To that 
end, California is the first state that has passed legislation in this area: The 
California Consumer Privacy Act which, in many ways, mirrors the 
European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).16 Much 
like the GDPR, as discussed below, it is not yet clear what effect the CCPA 
will have. However, it is likely that, as a state law, it will be less effective at 
curbing the surveillance efforts of the federal government. 
B. Government Access to Personal Data
In February 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments in United
States v. Microsoft,17 a case that sought to answer the question of whether 
or not the United States government could compel an American email 
service provider to comply with a warrant under the Stored 
Communications Act (SCA)18 for material under the provider’s control 
9 Id. at 564. 
10 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2262 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
11 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-45 (1979) (“[A] person has no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”). 
 12 See e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (“The fact that technology now 
allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the information 
any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought.”). 
13 Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2221. 
 14 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (there is no “general 
‘constitutional right to privacy’”). 
15 Id. at 350-51. 
16 See DataGuidance and Future of Privacy Forum, Comparing Privacy Laws: GDPR v. 
CCPA, FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM (Nov. 2018), https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2018/11/GDPR_CCPA_Comparison-Guide.pdf. 
17 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S.Ct. 1186 (2018). 
18 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2010). 
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where the provider has decided to store the material abroad. The SCA, 
enacted in 1986, provides authority for the government to compel a 
communications service provider to disclose content of materials stored 
electronically responsive to a court order.19 The SCA did not contemplate 
the present-day reality that such information is often stored on servers all 
over the world. 
The lower court in Microsoft, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 
held that the SCA did not allow the government to compel a provider to 
produce content responsive to a court order.20 However, a Pennsylvania 
District Court ruled contrary to the Second Circuit’s holding in Microsoft in 
a similar case involving information stored by Google.21 Google 
Pennsylvania was distinguishable from Microsoft as the two providers used 
different underlying cloud models. The storage method used by Microsoft, 
known as data localization, is where a provider stores information in a 
cloud “that is restricted to a single country or region.”22 The method used 
by Google, known as data shard storage, is where a provider “operates a 
cloud network that ‘automatically moves data from one location on 
Google’s network to another.’”23 
Under the SCA as it existed when these cases were decided, without 
the authority to compel disclosure via court order, the U.S. government 
would have to go through diplomatic channels and request the information 
through the government where the data was stored. In the case of Microsoft, 
this was straightforward enough; the server was located in Ireland so the 
United States would have to petition the Irish government to compel 
Microsoft to comply with the court order. As we will see, this was, and 
remains, an imperfect procedure, but there was at least a framework in 
place to deal with these issues. 
The data shard storage used in Google Pennsylvania complicated the 
government’s ability to avail itself of this diplomatic option. Data shard 
storage involves constantly moving data around between servers, and, as a 
result, it may be impossible for Google to know exactly where the physical 
location of a particular content is at any given time. Therefore, the 
government cannot submit a request with a foreign state because it is 
impossible to know which state to ask. Further, it is also possible for the 
 19 See id. § 2703(a) (“A governmental entity may require the disclosure . . . pursuant to a 
warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure . . 
. by a court of competent jurisdiction.”). 
 20 In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by 
Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded sub nom. United States 
v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018).
21 In re Search Warrant No. 16-960-M-01, 232 F. Supp. 3d 708 (E.D. Pa. 2017)
(“Google Pennsylvania”), aff’d, 275 F. Supp. 3d 605 (E.D. Pa. 2017). 
22 Paul M. Schwartz, Legal Access to the Global Cloud, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1696 
(2018). 
23 Id. at 1695. 
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“shards” that make up the content in question to be stored in many different 
places at once. Effectively, if the government could not compel Google, or 
any provider using data shard storage, to produce content responsive to a 
court order under the SCA, there may not have been another option.24 
Given the discord on the issue within a single circuit, and indeed 
throughout the country, this was clearly a question that needed to be 
answered. Before the Court could rule in Microsoft, Congress enacted the 
Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act as part of an over 
2,000-page omnibus budget bill.25 The CLOUD Act was passed with the 
support of many cloud storage providers, including Microsoft and Google.26 
The CLOUD Act contained two main parts. The first part amended the 
SCA and provided the government with the authority to compel compliance 
with a warrant in cases where the subscriber was in the United States and 
the production of responsive material would happen in the United States. 
This answered the question before the Court in Microsoft, and the case was 
dismissed as moot.27 
There is little question that it was necessary to amend the SCA.28 The 
SCA itself was enacted because technology had begun to outpace the law. 
Before the SCA, there was little protection for electronic information stored 
with third parties. The Fourth Amendment, because of the third-party 
doctrine, afforded little protection.29 Congress, by enacting the SCA, was 
acknowledging that, as technology changed, so too must the law. With that 
in mind, it is almost hard to believe that it took another thirty-three years 
before Congress addressed the issue again. It is also alarming that, when 
they finally did take up the issue, they passed the CLOUD Act in a rush, 
tacked onto a 2,232-page omnibus budget bill without review by a 
committee in either house.30 
The CLOUD Act also went a step further than simply amending the 
SCA to solve the extraterritorial issue in Microsoft. The second part 
24 Google Pennsylvania, 232 F. Supp. 3d at 723-25. 
25 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348, 1212-
25. 
 26 Letter from Apple, Google, Microsoft, & Oath to Sens. Orinn Hatch, Christopher 
Coons, Lindsey Graham, & Sheldon Whitehouse (Feb. 6, 2018), https://blogs.microsoft.com/ 
datalaw/wp-content/uploads/sites/149/2018/02/Tech-Companies-Letter-of-Support-for-
Senate-CLOUD-Act-020618.pdf [hereinafter, Letter from Apple, Google, Microsoft]. 
 27 After the enactment of the CLOUD Act, the government served Microsoft with a new 
warrant under that authority. The Court remanded the case back to the Second Circuit with 
instructions to dismiss the case as moot. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1188 
(2018). 
 28 See Christine Galvagna, The Necessity of Human Rights Legal Protections in Mutual 
Legal Assistance Treaty Reform, 9 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. 57, 58 (2019). 
29 See Kerr, supra note 8. 
 30 See David Ruiz, Responsibility Deflected, the CLOUD Act Passes, ELEC. FRONTIER 
FOUND. (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/03/responsibility-deflected-
cloud-act-passes. 
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empowered the Attorney General to enter into executive agreements with 
foreign countries, lifting the blocking provisions in the SCA on a country-
by-country basis.31 It is the second part of the CLOUD Act that has the 
greatest privacy implications. 
Part two of the CLOUD Act allows the Attorney General to enter into 
such agreements only when the other country’s law “affords robust and 
procedural protections for privacy and civil liberties in light of the data 
collection and activities that the foreign government that will be subject to 
the agreement.”32 The CLOUD Act includes a non-exhaustive list of factors 
that the Attorney General should consider, such as prohibitions against 
torture and fair trial rights, but does not make any of the factors mandatory, 
or otherwise assign weight to any of the factors. 
Further, the ability to review or oversee the implementation of 
agreements made under the CLOUD Act is, simply put, non-existent. The 
Attorney General is charged with drafting, entering, and maintaining the 
agreements. The Act does include a provision that the foreign government 
must agree to a periodic review by the United States government.33 
However, there is no requirement that the U.S. government actually 
conduct such review. Further, even if such review were to be conducted, it 
would not necessarily be conducted by the Attorney General. 
There is no mechanism for the content of the agreements to be 
disclosed. The first country that the United States has entered an agreement 
with is the United Kingdom. The U.S. government declined to release a 
draft of the agreement prior to its ratification and did not release the content 
of the agreement afterwards. There have been reports that other countries 
have discussed entering into such agreements with the United States, but 
there are few publicly available details.34 There are some parallels to this 
such as the secret treaty that formed the basis of the United States-United 
Kingdom spy alliance that led to the creation of the Five Eyes alliance: the 
intelligence alliance comprised of the United States, United Kingdom, 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.35 Given the general distrust of the 
international community regarding the actions of the United States and its 
allies, the fact that the U.S. government will not disclose even who it has 
discussed such agreements with will surely raise eyebrows. For instance, if 
the United States were to have only negotiated agreements with other Five 
 31 Jennifer Daskal, Privacy and Security Across Borders, 128 Yale L.J. F. 1029, 1038 
(2019). 
32 CLOUD Act §105, 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(1). 
33 Id. at § 2523(J). 
34 See, e.g., Joint Statement Announcing United States and Australian Negotiation of a 
CLOUD Act Agreement by U.S. Attorney General William Barr and Minister for Home 
Affairs Peter Dutton, DEP’T OF JUST. (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/joint-
statement-announcing-united-states-and-australian-negotiation-cloud-act-agreement-us. 
 35 Leo Kelion, NSA-GCHQ Snowden Leaks: A Glossary of Key Terms, BRITISH BROAD. 
CORP. (Jan. 28, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-25085592. 
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Eyes nations, or with Israel, but not nations such as Germany and France, 
this would undoubtedly have an impact on international relations with the 
United States, as well as American companies. 
The effect is that the standards set out for the Attorney General to 
follow are—much like the Pirate Code—mere guidelines rather than actual 
standards.36 As the chief law enforcement officer, it is hard to imagine an 
Attorney General protecting individual privacy interests at the expense of 
more expansive law enforcement powers. 
This is not to say that the part two of the CLOUD Act is an answer in 
search of a problem. In the investigation underlying Microsoft, the U.S. 
government made a conscious decision to pursue a warrant under the SCA, 
despite the fact that the law was unsettled. There was another, well-
established, method through which the government could have sought the 
data that Microsoft had stored on its servers in Iceland: Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaties (“MLAT”).37 
The United States is a party to more than fifty bilateral MLATs, as 
well as similar agreements with the European Union and foreign states.38 
Requests made under MLATs are processed on a case-by-case basis. The 
requesting state reaches out to the government with jurisdiction over the 
property and then waits for the government to respond.39 This process is 
slow, and particularly ill-suited with regards to digital evidence.40 
Meanwhile, the number of MLAT requests has grown exponentially.41 
Other than the general inefficiency and inefficacy of the MLAT 
process, there was no reason why the government could not have used the 
MLAT process in the case underlying Microsoft. The magistrate in the 
District Court, in support of the issuance of the warrant, noted that the 
“slow and laborious” MLAT procedures constituted such a “substantial” 
 36 See Sabrina A. Morris, Rethinking the Extraterritorial Scope of the United States’ 
Access to Data Stored by a Third Party, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 183, 213 (2018) (observing 
that the statute “provides only factors, not requirements” that the Attorney General must 
consider before approving a data sharing agreement and noting that the agreements are not 
subject to judicial review)(citation omitted); Captain Hector Barbossa, PIRATES OF THE
CARIBBEAN: THE CURSE OF THE BLACK PEARL (Walt Disney Pictures and Jerry Bruckheimer 
Films 2003) (40:50) (“The Code is more what you’d call guidelines than actual rules.”). 
 37 See Jonah Force Hill, Problematic Alternatives: MLAT Reform for the Digital Age, 
HARV. L. SCH. NAT’L. SECURITY J. (Jan. 28, 2015), https://harvardnsj.org/2015/01/ 
problematic-alternatives-mlat-reform-for-the-digital-age/ for an overview of the MLAT 
process. 
 38 RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF LAW OF THE U.S. § 429 
Reporter’s Note 1 (AM. LAW INST. 2018). 
39 Daskal, supra note 31 at 1034. 
40 Morris, supra note 36 at 203-04. 
 41 The Department of Justice estimates that number of MLAT requests “has increased 
by nearly 60 percent and the number of requests for computer records has increased 
ten-fold.” U.S. Dep’t of Just., FY 2015 Budget Request (July 13, 2014), retrieved from 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/2014/07/13/mut-legal-assist.pdf 
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burden on the government as to necessitate another option.42 A general 
desire for another option is likely what motivated the government to forgo 
the MLAT process and seek the content through a warrant; the ensuing 
legal fight was worth fighting. 
III. PRIVACY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AROUND THE WORLD
This section will examine the privacy law landscape in the European
Union and China. While it may seem like an odd paring at first glance, 
contrasting privacy law schemes between these two jurisdictions 
specifically helps illuminate how government law enforcement’s interests 
can work to thwart even the most comprehensive privacy protections. 
A. Data Privacy Law in China and the European Union
In 2016, the European Union passed its landmark privacy legislation,
the General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”).43 It has been recognized 
as one of the strongest and most comprehensive attempts by a government 
to safeguard individuals’ personal data.44 The GDPR is part of a larger trend 
of the European Union’s attempts to help protect the privacy of its citizens. 
The Data Protection Directive, adopted by the E.U. in the 1995, required 
“each of the twenty-eight Member States to enact national legislation that 
protects ‘the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in 
particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal 
data.’” 45 In 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union recognized a 
“right to be forgotten.”46 
Despite the relative inaction on the part of the United States, the 
European Union is not the only jurisdiction which has sought to enact 
strong statutory individual privacy protections. China has enacted privacy 
laws that, on their face, are as comprehensive as the GDPR.47 Though there 
are many reasons why the Chinese privacy laws have not received the same 
attention—the EU is a first mover and a longtime ally of the United 
States—it must also be due, at least in part, to China’s past abuses in this 
area.48 Simply put, it is easy to dismiss Chinese privacy protections because 
 42 In re A Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by 
Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Orin S. Kerr, The Next 
Generation Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 373, 409 (2014)). 
43 Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L119). 
 44 The EU General Data Protection Regulation, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 6, 2018, 
5:00 AM). https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/06/eu-general-data-protection-regulation#. 
45 Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Towards a Global Data Privacy Standard, 
71 Fla. L. Rev. 365, 373-74 (2019) (citing Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 1). 
46 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, 2014 
E.C.R. 317 (2014).
47 Griffen Thorne, GDPR Meets its Match . . . in China, CHINA LAW BLOG (July 14,
2019), https://www.chinalawblog.com/2019/07/gdpr-meets-its-match-in-china.html. 
48 See, e.g., Nithin Coca, China’s Xinjiang Surveillance is the Dystopian Future Nobody 
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many believe that the Chinese government, and perhaps the Chinese culture 
broadly, traditionally do not value individual privacy.49 
However, this attitude towards Chinese privacy legislation misses the 
point. In some respects, the Chinese law places even greater burdens on 
providers before they collect and use personal data, especially with regards 
to gaining user consent.50 Companies doing business in China, including 
those from the United States or European Union, must comply with these 
standards just as they must with the GDPR in Europe. Both the GDPR and 
Chinese law require companies with no physical presence in the respective 
jurisdictions to comply with the law.51 It is true that the goal of Chinese 
privacy law may not so much be the protection of privacy itself but the goal 
of the Chinese government to protect its internet and domestic providers 
from foreign companies.52 This does not change the fact that these 
standards still have the impact of protecting the data privacy of its citizens, 
though it may not be the driving force. 
Further, it is not yet clear whether the GDPR will be able to achieve its 
lofty goals. Despite its history of legal protections for individual data 
privacy, such regulations in Europe have not always proven effective.53 
Wants, ENGADGET (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.engadget.com/2018-02-22-china-xinjiang-
surveillance-tech-spread.html (observing that the Chinese government shut off the internet 
following deadly protests in 2009); Chris Buckley, Crackdown on Bloggers is Mounted by 
China, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/11/world/asia/china-
cracks-down-on-online-opinion-makers.html (discussing the arrest of bloggers critical of the 
Chinese government). 
 49 See, e.g., Xiaofeng Lin, A Dangerous Game: China’s Big Data Advantage and How 
the U.S. Should Respond, 2020 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 253, 269-70 (2020) (contrasting 
the American concept of “privacy as a fundamental human right” with the traditional 
Chinese cultural view that privacy “has a negative connotation”); Tiffany Li, Zhou Zhou & 
Jill Bronfman, Saving Face: Unfolding the Screen of Chinese Privacy Law, J.L., INFO., & 
SCI., 5 (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2826087 (“The idea of an individual 
having the right to an intangible concept like privacy . . . was [] relatively unheard of.”); Ann 
Bartow, The Second Wave of Global Privacy Protection: Privacy Laws and Privacy Levers: 
Online Surveillance Versus Economic Development in the People’s Republic of China, 74 
OHIO ST. L.J. 853, 856 (2013) (observing that “longstanding social norms” thwart individual 
freedom protections and that “Chinese citizens participate in a culture of peer observation 
and orchestrated scrutiny”); cf. Clay Chandler & David Z. Morris, China’s Lax Attitude 
About Privacy is Shifting – Data Sheet, FORTUNE (Aug. 20, 2019, 2:03 PM), 
https://fortune.com/2019/08/20/china-privacy-data-sheet/ (observing that the traditional 
notion that “Chinese culture generally doesn’t place the same value on privacy that Western 
culture does” is changing); Harrison Jacobs, Chinese People Don’t Care About Privacy on 
the Internet — Here’s Why, According to a Top Professor in China, INSIDER (June 26, 2018, 
1:08 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/why-china-chinese-people-dont-care-about-
privacy-2018-6 (comparing the more subdued reaction to revelations regarding misuse of 
data in China to similar events in the United States and Europe that sparked outrage in part 
because “[They] don’t have privacy in China traditionally”). 
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There are reasons to believe that the GDPR itself may suffer from some of 
the same issues as the laws that came before it.54 Ultimately, it will take 
some time before we know just how effective the GDPR will be. As with 
any new law, the rights and duties of providers under the GDPR will 
crystalize over time as people and companies challenge competing 
interpretations and practices. To that end, there is reason to be bullish on 
the real-world impact that the GDPR will ultimately have. Google is still 
the largest lobbyist in the European Union and the United States.55 
Meanwhile, at the other end of the spectrum, the GDPR has had an adverse 
effect on European tech startups.56 Beyond the tech industry, there is 
evidence that the GDPR has had a negative impact on the economy of the 
European Union as a whole.57 This is all in addition to the direct cost to 
European governments of enforcing the GDPR. Companies doing business 
in the European Union, rather than risk being penalized for failing to 
comply with the European Union, have overreported potential issues to 
regulators.58 The result has been that regulators have struggled to keep up 
with the increased workload under the GDPR.59 Despite all of the costs, the 
European people—the people the GDPR was enacted to protect—do not 
believe that they have any more control over their data, nor has it increased 
trust on the internet.60 
Given the many costs of the GDPR, it is easy to see how the law may 
fail to live up to its potential. A foreseeable outcome of the law is to restrict 
the growth of new tech companies in Europe and large providers such as 
Facebook and Google are able to use their influence and resources to either 
change or avoid the law. A common criticism of large tech companies is the 
practice of buying startups and preventing them from growing into 
COMPLIANCE WEEK (Nov. 28, 2018 3:30 AM), https://www.complianceweek.com/data-
privacy/privacy-advocate-schrems-foresees-lax-enforcement-of-gdpr/24736.article 
(observing that the EU data protection directive that proceeded the GDPR was ineffective as 
it made more financial sense for companies to ignore the law and pay the penalties). 
54 Id. 
 55 SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM 124-25 (PublicAffairs 
2019). 
56 See generally Jian Jia et al., The Short-Run Effects of GDPR on Technology Venture 
Investment (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 25248, Nov. 8, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3278912. 
 57 Merrill Corp., GDPR Burdens Hinder M&A Transactions in the EMEA Region, (Nov. 
13, 2018), https://www.merrillcorp.com/us/en/company/news/press-releases/gdpr-burdens-
hinder-m-a-transactions-in-the-emea-region.html. 
 58 Catherine Stupp, European Privacy Regulators Find Their Workload Expands Along 




 60 Eline Chivot, What the Evidence Shows About the Impact of the GDPR After One 
Year, CTR. FOR DATA INNOVATION (June 17, 2019), https://www.datainnovation.org/2019/06/ 
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competitors.61 Indeed, to this point the GDPR has resulted in Google 
receiving more user data than it did before.62 If this trend continues, the 
negative impact on the economy as a whole does not reverse, public 
sentiment does not change, and the cost to regulators remains high, 
countries in the European Union may start underenforcing the GDPR, just 
as has happened with previous data privacy schemes in the European 
Union. It is possible that this is already occurring. At least three member 
states of the European Union have yet to fully adapt their national 
legislation to the standards required by the GDPR.63 
Of course, it is still early. It is possible for the European Union to 
work out the kinks. Even if the GDPR does not accomplish everything it set 
out to, as the most comprehensive privacy legislation in the world, it may 
still achieve quite a lot. On the other hand, acknowledging that the future of 
the GDPR is uncertain is also acknowledging there is a possibility that it 
might fail. It then becomes appropriate to wonder what is so special about 
the GDPR that has earned it praise from privacy advocates who, at the same 
time, have not quite embraced similar privacy protections in China. There 
are any number of explanations. China has long criticized the Western 
media of being biased against China.64 Though western bias almost 
certainly plays some role, another factor is likely the motivation behind the 
laws themselves. The motivation behind the GDPR is the protection of 
individual personal privacy, whereas the motivation behind Chinese privacy 
law is the protection of Chinese interests.65 There seems to be a belief that, 
because the guiding principle behind the GDPR is the protection of 
individuals, that enforcement and adjudication of the GDPR will, on the 
whole, reflect this principle. 
On the other hand, where the Chinese government is motivated by 
protecting China, any conflicts will be resolved in favor of the government 
rather than individual privacy interests. Personal privacy concerns have not 
prevented the Chinese government from establishing an expansive 
surveillance state.66 Much of the infrastructure behind the current 
surveillance framework in China relies on its ability to filter and control the 
 61 Richard Waters, Big Tech’s ‘buy and kill’ tactics come under scrutiny, FIN. TIMES 
(Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/39b5c3a8-4e1a-11ea-95a0-43d18ec715f5. 
 62 Björn Greif, Study: Google is the Biggest Beneficiary of the GDPR, CLIQZ (Oct. 10, 
2018), https://cliqz.com/en/magazine/study-google-is-the-biggest-beneficiary-of-the-gdpr. 
63 Chivot, supra note 60. 
 64 Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, How China Won the War Against Western Media, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 4, 2016, 1:09 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/04/china-won-
war-western-media-censorship-propaganda-communist-party/. 
65 Thorne, supra note 47. 
66 Anna Mitchell & Larry Diamond, China’s Surveillance State Should Scare Everyone, 
THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/ 
02/china-surveillance/552203/. 
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internet.67 The Chinese government has worked towards developing a social 
credit system—an attempt to place a value on each citizen’s social and 
political behavior—by keeping track of each communication, transaction, 
and website visit made by its citizens.68 Similar data collection has fueled 
China’s predictive policing efforts.69 Enabled by its vast surveillance 
network, law enforcement assigns a “score” for certain activities, such as 
praying regularly or leaving the house through the back door, and arrests 
people with scores below a certain threshold or people deemed threats by an 
algorithm.70 Such efforts make it clear that, however concerned the Chinese 
government is with protecting the personal information of its citizens, it is 
more concerned with protecting the Chinese government. 
Though there is certainly room to debate the true motivations of the 
EU and China in enacting their otherwise similarly comprehensive privacy 
protection schemes, it is clear that there is more skepticism of China’s 
efforts because they prioritize state interests over those of individuals. This, 
however, assumes that the European Union, and by extension the GDPR, is 
not susceptible of falling into the same trap. After all, the GDPR does 
contain broad exceptions related to law enforcement and national security.71 
The Chinese have also implicated law enforcement and national security 
concerns in order to justify their surveillance schemes.72 It may be easy to 
say that the E.U. and China are so fundamentally different that the 
inadequacy of Chinese privacy law to protect it from the Chinese 
government itself is a uniquely Chinese phenomenon. To a certain extent, 
that is certainly true.73 However, it would be a mistake to assume that the 
GDPR could not be similarly thwarted in the name of law enforcement and 
national security.74 
67 Id. 
 68 China invents the digital totalitarian state, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 17, 2016), 
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2016/12/17/china-invents-the-digital-totalitarian-state. 
69 Emma Graham-Harrison and Juliette Garside, Revealed: Power and Reach of China’s 
Surveillance Dragnet, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 24, 2019 6:03 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/24/china-cables-revealed-power-and-reach-
of-chinas-surveillance-dragnet. 
 70 Id.; Interview by Dave Davies with Kai Strittmatter, Facial Recognition and Beyond: 
Journalist Ventures Inside China’s ‘Surveillance State’, NPR (Jan. 5, 2021) (transcript at 
https://www.npr.org/transcripts/953515627); Josh Chin, About to Break the Law? Chinese 
Police are Already on to You, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 27, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-said-to-deploy-big-data-for-predictive-policing-in-
xinjiang-1519719096. 
71 GDPR, supra note 16 art. 23. 
72 Mitchell, supra note 66. 
73 See, e.g., Amy Hawkins, Chinese Citizens Want the Government to Rank Them, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (May 24, 2017), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/24/chinese-citizens-
want-the-government-to-rank-them/ (observing that there is real support among the Chinese 
citizenry for a social credit system maintained by the Chinese government). 
 74 Natalia Drozdiak, EU Privacy Laws May Be Hampering Pursuit of Terrorists, 
BLOOMBERG (July 8, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-
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B. Government Access to Data in the EU and China
For all the GDPR may do to protect the data privacy of individuals, it
is unlikely to curtail large scale government surveillance.75 As discussed 
above, there are a number of reasons that the GDPR may be underenforced 
by member states. That is even before considering the competing interests 
of law enforcement. Though law enforcement and national security interests 
are unlikely to completely handicap the GDPR, it seems likely that it will 
prevent the GDPR from having the far-reaching impact that many privacy 
advocates hope for. 
There is evidence that the European Union is willing to sacrifice 
privacy protections for individuals, in the name of law enforcement and 
national security. In 2017, the United States entered into an agreement, the 
E.U.-U.S. Privacy Shield, that allows for companies to freely transfer user
data from the European Union to the United States.76 Though the E.U.-U.S.
Privacy Shield does not directly implicate national security or law
enforcement—it allows providers to transfer data freely between the two
jurisdictions—the E.U. entering the agreement can be seen as an
endorsement of the surveillance schemes in the United States.77 At the very
least, it indicates that the E.U., or at least individual member states, may
establish similar programs without running afoul of the GDPR.
As part of entering into the agreement with the United States, the 
European Union stated that the agreement was prudent because the United 
States had sufficient privacy protections in place.78 The E.U. reached this 
conclusion despite the existence of multiple government surveillance 
programs that fall well short of E.U. privacy protection requirements.79 As 
discussed above, the citizens of the United States do not have any general 
right to personal privacy. To the extent that there are Fourth Amendment 
protections, they do not extend outside of the jurisdiction of the United 
States and would offer no protection to non-U.S. citizen users in Europe.80 
The Privacy Shield allows for companies to freely transfer user data from 
the European Union to the United States. United States law “empowers the 
intelligence agencies to ‘target’ non-U.S. persons overseas for warrantless 
telephone or internet monitoring.”81 This means that the United States 
08/european-privacy-laws-may-be-hampering-those-catching-terrorists. 
75 The EU General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 44. 
 76 Maria McFarland Sanchez-Moreno of Human Rights Watch and Iverna McGowan of 
Amnesty International, Joint Letter to European Commission on EU-US Privacy Shield, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 26, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/26/joint-letter-
european-commission-eu-us-privacy-shield#. 
77 Id. 
78 US Surveillance Makes Privacy Shield Invalid, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 26, 
2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/26/us-surveillance-makes-privacy-shield-invalid. 
79 Id. 
80 Joint Letter, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 76, at 5 n.16. 
81 Id. at 7. 
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government can request, without a court order, the user data that private 
companies collect on users within the European Union.82 
It is possible, if not likely, that the European Union entered into the 
Privacy Shield agreement because it could not afford to sever ties with the 
United States—not because it actually believed the United States had 
sufficient privacy protections in place. The European Union has clearly 
been dissatisfied with the privacy protections offered for E.U. citizens by 
the United States, to the point where the European Union threatened to pull 
out of the agreement.83 Two years later, despite uneven progress at best, the 
Privacy Shield remains in place, calling into question how serious the EU is 
about U.S. compliance.84 
Another reason that the European Union may not be willing to 
seriously object is that, in spite of all of its efforts to protect the privacy of 
its citizens from abuse by providers, it does not have similar reservations 
about government use of the same data. While the European Union was 
enacting the GDPR and E.U. Courts were deciding cases like Google v. 
Spain,85 member states of the E.U. were also building their own mass 
surveillance programs which were, in turn, legitimized by E.U. courts.86 
Also, the European Union is currently attempting to answer the same 
jurisdictional question that Part 2 of the CLOUD Act was intended to solve. 
The European Union’s proposal regulating e-evidence87 grants jurisdiction 
over a person’s data when a requesting government otherwise has 
jurisdiction over that person, regardless of where the data is stored. Despite 
the GDPR having just gone into effect, the e-evidence regulation as it 
stands is almost completely devoid of any meaningful protections for 
personal privacy.88 Private companies have spoken out against the e-
evidence regulation for not protecting fundamental privacy rights.89 Some 
82 Id. 
 83 Hayley Evans & Shannon Togawa Mercer, Privacy Shield on Shaky Ground: What’s 
Up With EU-U.S. Data Privacy Regulations, LAWFARE (Sept. 2, 2018, 2:31 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/privacy-shield-shaky-ground-whats-eu-us-data-privacy-
regulations. 
84 Nicole Lindsey, Second Review of EU-US Privacy Shield Shows Improvements, CPO 
MAG. (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.cpomagazine.com/data-protection/second-review-of-eu-
us-privacy-shield-shows-improvements/. 
85 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, 2014 
E.C.R. 317 (2014).
86 Asaf Lubin, Legitimizing Foreign Mass Surveillance in the European Court of
Human Rights, JUST SEC. (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/59923/legitimizing-
foreign-mass-surveillance-european-court-human-rights/. 
 87 Regulation on Cross Border Access to E-Evidence: Council Agrees its Position, 
EUROPEAN COUNCIL (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2018/12/07/regulation-on-cross-border-access-to-e-evidence-council-agrees-its-
position/. 
 88 “E-evidence”: Repairing the Unrepairable, EUROPEAN DIG. RIGHTS (Nov. 14, 2019), 
https://edri.org/e-evidence-repairing-the-unrepairable/. 
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privacy advocates have even expressed concern that the e-evidence 
regulation could lead to de-facto “privatization of law enforcement.”90 
There is some evidence that we are seeing the beginning of this kind of 
privatization of law enforcement with regard to national security. The 
European Union has suggested, similar to China, that the tech industry has 
an obligation to develop tools that can automatically detect and remove 
content that may incite terrorism.91 Further, the European Union has said 
“subject to appropriate safeguards, the availability of data should be 
secured” to preserve government access to electronic evidence.92 
None of this is to say that the regulations and law enforcement data 
collection schemes in the European Union are exceedingly draconian. In 
China, any tech provider that collects personal data must also store the data 
in China.93 Though the Chinese government insists that this is in order to 
protect the privacy of the Chinese people, it is generally understood to 
“give the government unrestricted access to almost all personal data.”94 
Chinese tech companies—from online retailers and search engines to social 
media and messaging providers—routinely turn over data to the Chinese 
government.95 The Chinese government also has the ability to target and 
suspend social media accounts that contain key terms.96 The state has also 
asked companies to develop software that can use data collected to predict 
terrorist attacks.97 
Again, these programs are far more draconian than anything in place 
in the European Union or United States. But, as tempting as it may be, it 
would be a mistake to believe that such programs could not exist in the 
West because we have a fundamentally different understanding of 
individual rights than China. As true as that may be, it has not always been 
enough to keep Western governments from engaging in surveillance and 
data collection programs that would be impossible if those governments, or 
at least the people who ran the programs, placed any real importance in the 
European Law Enforcement Authorities’ Access to Data, MICROSOFT (Nov. 6, 2019), 
https://blogs.microsoft.com/eupolicy/2019/11/06/e-evidence-fundamental-rights-protections-
needed/. 
 90 Katitza Rodriguez, A Tale of Two Poorly Designed Cross-Border Data Access 
Regimes, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/04/ 
tale-two-poorly-designed-cross-border-data-access-regimes. 
 91 European Council Conclusions on Security and Defence, 22/06/2017, EUROPEAN 
COUNCIL (June 22, 2017), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/ 
06/22/euco-security-defence/. 
92 Id. 
 93 Sara Xia, China Data Protection Regulations (CDPR), CHINA LAW BLOG (May 20, 
2018), https://www.chinalawblog.com/2018/05/china-data-protection-regulations-cdpr.html. 
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privacy rights of individuals.98 The only absolute barrier that exists is that in 
the European Union and the United States, governments do not have the 
same degree of control over the tech providers in their jurisdictions as the 
Chinese government does over Chinese companies. In China, technology 
companies are, in many ways, de facto arms of the state and cannot refuse 
to cooperate with the Chinese government.99 As such state control does not 
exist in the West, providers can oppose new regulation that may be harmful 
to their consumers, and by extension, the companies themselves.100 
However, this requires the tech companies to be willing to stand up to the 
government rather than conduct the surveillance on the government’s 
behalf. To the extent that what separates the West from China is that 
companies in China “have no meaningful ability to tell the Chinese 
Communist Party ‘no,’”101 it requires that the companies in the West who 
can say no do so when necessary. 
IV. PRIVATE PROVIDERS AND GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE
Thus far, we have seen what government has required, or can require,
of providers in order to ensure individuals some measure of privacy with 
regards to their personal data. We have also seen how law enforcement and 
national security interests can be antagonistic to attempts by government to 
protect the privacy of its people. At this point, it is important to examine the 
role that the providers themselves have in the struggle between privacy and 
law enforcement interests. 
Tech providers play an active role in shaping public policy in a wide 
 98 See, e.g., COINTELPRO FBI Records: The Vault, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2020), https://vault.fbi.gov/cointel-pro (In the mid-twentieth century, the 
FBI engaged in surveillance of social and political activist organizations such as the 
Communist Party, the Black Panther Party, and individual leaders such as Martin Luther 
King Jr. The FBI concedes that the surveillance was improper for “abridging first 
amendment rights and for other reasons.”). 
 99 See, e.g., Alex Johnson, ‘An Arm of the Chinese State’: What’s Behind the Huawei 
Indictments, NBC NEWS (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/arm-
chinese-state-what-s-behind-huawei-indictments-n963776 (observing that, according to U.S. 
government officials the Chinese government subsidizes Huawei and that using Huawei’s 
products made users vulnerable to Chinese surveillance); Jane Li, A US Official Says Tech 
Giants Alibaba and Tencent Present Similar Risks as Huawei, QUARTZ (Sept. 13, 2019), 
https://qz.com/1708662/chinese-tech-giants-tools-of-the-communist-party-us-official/ 
(reporting that a U.S. State Department official suggested that other large tech companies are 
either de facto or de jure arms of the state in part because they cannot refuse requests from 
the Chinese government). 
 100 An easy example of this is the Microsoft case that triggered the passage of the 
CLOUD Act. Microsoft itself, not the individual in question, challenged the subpoena for the 
emails related to a certain account. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S.Ct. (2018). Of 
course, Microsoft also supported the CLOUD Act, suggesting that, at least in part, it 
objected to the subpoena because it felt obligated to rather than out of a sense of duty to 
protect a user’s personal data. See Letter from Apple, Google, Microsoft, supra note 26. 
101 Li, supra note 99. 
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range of areas, including privacy and law enforcement.102 In 2017, Google 
spent more money on lobbying than any other company in the United 
States.103 In the European Union, Google engaged in a “hiring blitz” of 
former government officials with the aim to “boost its influence in 
European policy circles.”104 Other tech providers have followed Google’s 
lead.105 The role of tech providers in this sphere is not limited to trying to 
shape policy through traditional lobbying—they are also indispensable to 
modern law enforcement and national security efforts.106 
In mid-2013, Edward Snowden, an employee of the National Security 
Agency (NSA), leaked highly classified information which revealed 
extensive global surveillance programs, many of which were run by the 
NSA.107 Snowden collected about 1.7 million intelligence files108 
documenting the surveillance practices of the United States and the rest of 
the Five Eyes alliance. In particular, the Snowden disclosures detailed the 
PRISM surveillance program, a program under which the NSA collected 
electronic communications through various U.S. internet companies; in 
some cases, with the help of the providers themselves.109 The surveillance 
 102 See Tony Romm, Tech Giants Led by Amazon, Facebook, and Google Spent Nearly 
Half a Billion on Lobbying Over the Past Decade, New Data Shows, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 
2020 8:32 AM) (“Google lobbyists focused heavily on privacy.”) (quotation omitted); 
Deborah D’Souza, Tech Lobby: Internet Giants Spend Record Amounts, Electronics Firms 
Trim Budgets, INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/tech/what-are-
tech-giants-lobbying-trump-era/ (“Tech companies have continued fighting the government 
on surveillance issues, especially government requests for data.”). 
 103 Hamza Shaban, Google for the First Time Outspent Every Other Company to 
Influence Washington in 2017, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2018 6:35 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/01/23/google-outspent-every-
other-company-on-federal-lobbying-in-2017/. 
 104 Google’s European Revolving Door, TECH TRANSPARENCY PROJECT (June 4, 2016), 
https://www.techtransparencyproject.org/articles/googles-european-revolving-door. 
 105 See Tony Romm, Amazon, Facebook, Other Tech Giants Spent Roughly $65 Million 
to Lobby Washington Last Year, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2021 10:15 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/01/22/amazon-facebook-google-
lobbying-2020/ (outlining lobbying efforts by tech firms in the U.S.); Adam Satariano & 
Matina Stevis-Gridneff, Big Tech Turns its Lobbyists Loose on Europe, Alarming 
Regulators, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/14/technology/ 
big-tech-lobbying-europe.html (observing the same in the European Union). 
 106 See Chapter One: Cooperation or Resistance?: The Role of Tech Companies In 
Government Surveillance, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1722, 1722 (2018). 
 107 See Margaret Hu, Taxonomy of the Edward Snowden Disclosures, 72 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1679, for a comprehensive compilation and classification of the Snowden disclosures. 
 108 Chris Strohm & Del Quentin Wilber, Pentagon Says Snowden Took Most U.S. Secrets 
Ever: Rogers, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 9, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-
01-09/pentagon-finds-snowden-took-1-7-million-files-rogers-says.
109 An NSA PowerPoint presentation released as part of the Snowden disclosures
claimed that PRISM—which collected data directly from the servers of providers—was run 
with the assistance of the providers. Providers generally denied collaborating with the NSA, 
or even being aware of PRISM, but subsequent disclosures showed that some of the largest 
providers were willing participants in the program. Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, 
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programs revealed in the Snowden disclosures were merely part of an 
overall trend of law enforcement’s reliance on third party providers. 
Early examples of government relying on private companies to assist 
with surveillance can be seen with the enactment of so-called “lawful 
interception” laws in the 1990s. As telecommunications networks became 
increasingly digital, law enforcement wiretaps required the cooperation of 
providers as they could no longer simply plug into a phone line—literally 
tap the wire—and listen in on phone calls.110 In the mid-1990s, 
governments all over the world—including the United States, United 
Kingdom and European Union—enacted legislation that imposed an 
obligation on providers to provide law enforcement access to their network 
and support government interception of data.111 These regulations were 
eventually expanded or supplemented to require providers to store metadata 
and turn it over to law enforcement.112 Though law enforcement had long 
relied on the cooperation of third party providers, this was the first time an 
affirmative burden was placed on private companies to provide access to 
law enforcement.113 
As technology has progressed and more personal data is stored 
electronically, the U.S. government has moved quickly to ensure they did 
not have any interruptions in access.114 Though, the government has not 
simply needed to keep pace with technological advancements. The supply 
of personal data available to the government also needed to keep pace with 
an increase in demand. In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the 
U.S. government greatly expanded the power of the federal government in 
the name of combatting terrorism.115 It is this “militarized demand” for user 
data that has enabled providers to act without fear of sanction from of law 
enforcement because the interests of tech providers and law enforcement—
increased supply—are often aligned.116 
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In some respects, the U.S. government is actually incentivized to rely 
on private companies to conduct intelligence gathering for law 
enforcement.117 There is the obvious benefit to the government that, by 
soliciting data from various third parties, the government can collect more 
information than it could if it were doing the collection on its own. 
However, there are legal benefits as well. Professor Jon Michaels observed 
that by entering into informal agreements with private parties, law 
enforcement could avoid congressional or judicial oversight.118 Private 
parties, which did not have to operate within the statutory and regulatory 
framework required of law enforcement, gave law enforcement greater 
access to user information with fewer legal hurdles to clear along the 
way.119 
The Five Eyes publicly touted its collaboration with providers such as 
Google, Facebook, Microsoft, and Twitter to address online terrorism.120 
The European Union also announced that it expects the tech industry to 
develop technology and tools to help detect and remove online content that 
could incite terrorism.121 Practically, governments must cooperate with 
private actors in order to police the internet if for no other reason than the 
sheer impossibility of the task. 
It has generally been accepted that the loss of privacy is simply 
payment in exchange for the use of many modern services. Facebook, 
Google, and numerous other tech providers rely on a privacy-for-service 
business model; they do not charge their users for their service, but instead 
monetize user data.122 However, there is evidence that this bargain is 
becoming strained. An overwhelming majority of people in the United 
States believe that there should be stronger privacy protections, including a 
“right to be forgotten,” and Americans are divided on whether it is 
acceptable for law enforcement specifically to use or collect their personal 
data.123 As a result, not only must tech providers now comply with 
 117 Jon D. Michaels, All the President’s Spies: Private-Public Intelligence Partnerships 
in the War on Terror, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 901, 904 (2008). 
118  Id. 
 119 Id.; see also ZUBOFF, supra note 55 at 303 (explaining that Facebook does not have to 
adhere to the same standards required of government researchers). 
120 Five Country Ministerial, 2017 Joint Communique, PUBLIC SAFETY CANADA (June 26, 
2017), https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/fv-cntry-mnstrl-2017/fv-cntry-
mnstrl-2017-en.pdf. 
 121 Press Release, European Council, European Council Conclusions on Security and 
Defence (June 22, 2017), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017 
/06/22/euco-security-defence/. 
 122 Shara Tibken, Questions to Mark Zuckerberg Show Many Senators Don’t Get 
Facebook, C-NET (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.cnet.com/news/some-senators-in-congress-
capitol-hill-just-dont-get-facebook-and-mark-zuckerberg/. 
 123 Brooke Auxier & Lee Rainie, Key Takeaways on Americans’ Views About Privacy, 
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increased privacy legislation around the world, but they must also reassure 
consumers that they can use tech services and products and maintain some 
level of privacy. Thus, providers are fighting a battle over control of users’ 
personal data on two separate fronts. 
One solution for tech providers is to repackage this data and sell it to 
the government. Given that the public appears to be less skeptical of the 
government collecting and processing their personal data, it seems that, 
even if it does not improve the public’s opinion of tech providers, it may 
not have a negative impact.124 On the other front, there is little reason to 
believe that governments will object with any real force to this strategy. In 
the United States, law enforcement has used tools developed by tech 
providers that scan social media for potential threats.125 Beyond simply 
using tools that private tech companies have developed, the United States 
has taken an active role in funding these efforts, including providing 
funding to startups that create “threat scores” based on social media 
activity.126 This phenomenon is, of course, not restricted to small startups 
operating in this niche space. Tech companies based in the United States 
have helped the Chinese build their surveillance infrastructure.127 Facebook 
CEO Mark Zuckerberg even suggested that artificial intelligence could 
monitor private messages and flag suspicious activity, such as potential 
planning of terrorist attacks.128 
The collection of personal data is not limited to privacy-for-service 
providers. Internet service providers—ostensibly fee-for-service 
providers—armed with an expansive view of the entire web, have 
positioned themselves to compete with entities such as Google and 
Facebook for surveillance revenues.129 In 2016, the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) enacted rules that gave individuals 
control over how ISPs used their personal data.130 However, these privacy 
protections were short lived. In 2017, Congress passed legislation that 
rolled back the FCC rules and prevented it from creating similar rules in the 
about-privacy-surveillance-and-data-sharing/. 
124 See id. 
 125 Jonah Engel Bromwich, Mike Isaac & Daniel Victor, Police Use Surveillance Tool to 
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future.131 The result is that users are now paying ISPs for the privilege of 
having the whole of their internet activity available for sale, and, if history 
is any guide, law enforcement will be among those lining up to purchase 
it.132 
Providers also work directly with law enforcement, rather than simply 
selling or repurposing data it collects for other purposes. One of the more 
well-known efforts is the deployment of facial recognition.133 Deployment 
of facial recognition in the United States has been uneven. Some 
jurisdictions and even private companies have restricted its use by law 
enforcement over ethical concerns.134 Other jurisdictions have used facial 
recognition software that scrapes billions of images from the internet and 
compares them to footage captured by security cameras to identify possible 
matches.135 There are also ambitions plans to expand the use of facial 
recognition at the federal level where it is currently used by the Customs 
and Border Patrol.136 Law enforcement is not merely using the technology 
to identify suspects of crimes; they are also using it to identify protestors, 
journalists, and track immigrants.137 A similar technology, automatic 
license plate readers, allows law enforcement to track people in real time.138 
131 115 Pub L. No. 22, § 131 Stat. 88. 
 132 See Nathaniel Turner, Congress: Don’t Let Internet Providers Sell Our Data to the 
Highest Bidder, ACLU (Mar. 7, 2017) https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/ 
internet-privacy/congress-dont-let-internet-providers-sell-our-data-highest (observing that 
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Documents Show AT&T Secretly Sells Customer Data to Law Enforcement, THE GUARDIAN 
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customer data to local and federal law enforcement in secret). It is also possible that ISPs 
will simply turn over personal data to the government for free as they have in the past. See 
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LAWFARE (June 18, 2020, 8:01 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/facial-recognition-us-
isnt-china-yet (discussing facial recognition efforts in the United States). 
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Further, because the data is often stored for years at a time—by both law 
enforcement and private contractors who monetize the data—it can be used 
to look backwards and see where people were after the fact, not unlike the 
use of cell site location data that the Supreme Court has determined requires 
a warrant due to the privacy interests at stake.139 
Among the most sophisticated tools law enforcement uses are the ones 
that enable it to process the data it collects. One such platform, Palantir, 
was developed for counterinsurgency efforts in warzones and has been 
adapted for use by civilian law enforcement at the federal and local 
levels.140 Palantir allows law enforcement to filter through millions of 
records in a matter of minutes using only basic information.141 The data 
filtered by Palantir comes from various law enforcement databases, as well 
as external databases that include billions of records including things like 
utility bills, credit card information, retail customer lists, and social media 
data.142 All of this is just scratching the surface. Law enforcement is 
currently collecting far more data than it has a use for, and the largest police 
departments are using the most sophisticated tools.143 With time, new tools 
will inevitably be developed that make use of the surplus data, and will 
eventually filter into more law enforcement agencies. 
As long as governments are willing to participate in the monetization 
of user data by either paying for the data itself, or funding tools developed 
specifically for law enforcement, there is little reason for providers to 
change their practices. This is because, from the perspective of the 
providers, privacy is not a right, but a commodity.144 Though this may be a 
disquieting reality, it may also be a reason to be somewhat optimistic. To 
the extent that the “right” to privacy is for sale, providers can lose out on 
business where they cannot guarantee user privacy. American tech 
real time tracking). 
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Readers (ALPRs), EFF (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.eff.org/pages/automated-license-plate-
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contractors); Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2212-13 (2018) (the police used 
cell site location information to determine that Carpenter was at each location in a string of 
robberies). 
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companies alone lost billions of dollars in the immediate aftermath of the 
NSA leaks with billions more in losses projected over the following 
decade.145 Tech companies outside of the United States have successfully 
advertised that they do not have an American presence, taking business 
from their American competitors. Electronic communications providers 
have lost business as a result of United States surveillance and data 
collection practices.146 Mark Zuckerberg himself was highly critical of the 
Obama Administration’s reaction to the Snowden leaks because of the 
impact it had on Facebook’s business.147 Even non-tech companies have 
suffered as a direct result of the Snowden leaks.148 
There is evidence that tech companies, even those with spotty track 
records when it comes to user privacy, recognize that they must take at least 
some steps to protect their users’ privacy beyond the protections required 
by law. Mark Zuckerberg, at least publicly, abandoned his plans to mine 
private messages for potential terror plots.149 Facebook, as owner of the 
popular WhatsApp communications app, has also recently filed a lawsuit 
against an Israeli company for breaking through its encryption 
safeguards.150 Amazon and Microsoft suspended the use of their facial 
recognition software by law enforcement over ethical concerns and IBM 
stopped offering facial recognition software altogether.151 The largest tech 
companies in the United States are constantly trying to expand their 
presence in even the most basic and necessary aspects of day-to-day life. 
Facebook has been developing its own currency in the face of criticism 
from both private and public sectors.152 Given the typical users of 
cryptocurrency, its success very much depend on having strong protections 
in place for its users, especially to the extent that it requires standing up to 
the government.153 Google had to table a joint project with the government 
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to store medical records—specifically x-ray scans—over privacy 
concerns.154 Though the program was compliant with federal privacy laws, 
it called into question the extent to which the tech giant can protect user 
data privacy.155 
Even so, the public remains wary that tech providers can adequately 
protect their personal information. As a result, efforts by tech providers to 
influence potential government privacy initiatives, such as legislation, are 
likely to be met with skepticism. But, where their interests align, the 
general public and tech providers would do well to work together to ensure 
the effectiveness of any new privacy legislation. Though public pressure 
can force Congress to act, pressure alone is likely insufficient to ensure that 
the resulting legislation is effective, or achieves the public’s desired ends. 
For example, in the 1970s public outrage precipitated FISA, the act at 
the heart of so many privacy issues that we face today.156 Congress enacted 
the USA FREEDOM Act in response to public pressure following the 
Snowden disclosures.157 Clearly, public pressure can force Congress to act. 
However, mere action is not enough. The actions Congress takes must 
actually move the ball forward when it comes to protecting, or in some 
cases even creating the privacy rights of individuals. Any comprehensive 
privacy legislation, like the GDPR or CCPA, will be extremely complex. 
As a result, it is likely that many important details of such legislation will 
be lost on the general public.158 
Tech providers, on the other hand, will have the required 
sophistication to understand the impact of new legislation. For better or 
worse, they also have experience lobbying the government to get what they 
want. If tech providers can be convinced that what helps the general 
public—their customer base—helps them as well, the chances that new 
“[p]rivacy and freedom from government are sometimes presented as two of the big 
advantages of a cryptocurrency”). 
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privacy legislation will be effective rise exponentially. 
Ultimately, tech companies seek to maximize profits and shareholder 
value. If the public can make it worthwhile for these companies to protect 
their data, there is reason to be optimistic that they will do so. In some 
cases, tech companies have even taken the first step by standing up to law 
enforcement while making their case to the public. Apple has resisted 
assisting the FBI with breaking through the encryption on iPhones as part of 
terrorism investigations, with Apple CEO Tim Cook making an 
impassioned public statement in defense of Apple’s stance.159 Conversely, 
former Attorney General Bill Barr insisted that tech companies are catering 
to criminals by offering shelter from government surveillance.160 In making 
his own case to the public, former A.G. Barr asked “Do we want to live in a 
society like that?”161 Barr, of course, does not think we do. It remains to be 
seen whether the people agree. 
V. CONCLUSION
Data privacy will become a larger issue in the United States. What
remains to be seen is how effective attempts to create legal privacy 
protections will be. At the state level, the most comprehensive effort in the 
United States to extend legal protections for individual data privacy, the 
California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”), borrowed heavily from the 
GDPR.162 As a result, it shares many of its vulnerabilities.163 At the federal 
level, however, there is little reason to expect Congress to take up the issue 
in the foreseeable future.164 Any progress made in the courts is likely to be 
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TIMES (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/07/technology/apple-fbi-iphone-
encryption.html. 
 160 Id. (“Companies like Facebook are selling the idea that ‘no matter what you do, 
you’re completely impervious to government surveillance.”) 
161 Id. 
 162 See, e.g., Diane Y. Byun, Privacy or Protection: The Catch-22 of the CCPA, 32 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 246, 247 (2020) (characterizing the CCPA as the “strictest data privacy 
law in the United States”); Carol A. F. Umhoefer & Tracy Shapiro, CCPA v. GDPR: The 
Same, Only Different, DLA PIPER (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/ 
us/insights/publications/2019/04/ipt-news-q1-2019/ccpa-vs-gdpr/ (noting that, though there 
are differences between the GDPR and the California Consumer Privacy Act, they share key 
components); Jeewon Kim Serrato and Daniel Rosenzweig, GDPR, CCPA and Beyond: 
Changes in Data Privacy Laws and Enforcement Risks to Monitor in 2019, DATA 
PROTECTION REPORT (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.dataprotectionreport.com/2019/02/gdpr-
ccpa-and-beyond-changes-in-data-privacy-laws-and-enforcement-risks-to-monitor-in-2019/ 
(referring to new privacy legislation in the US as “GDPR copycat laws”). 
163 Greg Bensinger, So far, Under California’s New Privacy Law, Firms are Disclosing 
Too Little Data—Or Far Too Much, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2020), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/01/21/ccpa-transparency/. 
 164 David McCabe, Congress and Trump Agreed They Want a National Privacy Law. It 
is Nowhere in Sight, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/10/01/technology/national-privacy-law.html. 
Outsourcing the Police 
41:213 (2021) 
241 
slow and uneven.165 Should the Supreme Court address the issue, lower 
courts and advocates on both sides will still have to figure out how to 
interpret any new law, even if the Court expands privacy protections.166 All 
the while, technology will continue to advance. 
Regardless of where data privacy protections come from, in the 
foreseeable future it is almost certain that they will not come from the 
executive branch. Much of the modern data collection apparatus was 
created by the George W. Bush administration,167 expanded under the 
Obama administration,168 then maintained under the Trump 
administration.169 It seems unlikely that President Biden will depart from 
policies embraced by the Obama Administration. While it can be hard to 
predict technological advancements over the next five years, we can be 
certain that the executive’s goal will be to ensure that law enforcement is 
able to keep pace and maintain its broad surveillance and data collection 
programs. 
Americans will have to confront that it is likely impossible to have 
meaningful personal data privacy protections while maintaining current law 
enforcement and national security surveillance programs. This is not a new 
struggle. In recent years, advocates for stronger individual liberties have co-
opted Benjamin Franklin’s assertion that “Those who would give up 
essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither 
Liberty or Safety.”170 Such an absolutist position is untenable, and, it turns 
out, not what Benjamin Franklin was endorsing at the time.171 Rather, 
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Franklin understood that the real struggle was to find a correct balance 
between liberty and safety.172 Finding the right balance requires honesty 
about what the problem is and what effect privacy laws will have. 
It is easy to dismiss the totalitarian surveillance state in China as a 
uniquely Chinese problem that could not happen in the United States or 
Europe. An obvious difference is that the Chinese Communist Party is the 
paramount authority in China and has absolute authority over many Chinese 
institutions, including law enforcement.173 Further, the CCP uses its vast 
surveillance capabilities to commit human rights atrocities that are 
incomparable to anything in the United States or European Union. Via tens 
of millions of cameras, China uses facial recognition and “gait recognition” 
to monitor and identify political dissidents and minority groups—
particularly Tibetans and Uighurs.174 This has enabled China to ultimately 
detain over one million Uighurs and other Muslims in internment camps 
designed to erase religious and ethnic identities.175 For its part, China 
argues that the indoctrination of the Uighurs—officially declared genocide 
by the United States—serves legitimate law enforcement purposes.176 This 
fits in with what China sees as the purpose of law enforcement generally. 
Law enforcement in China does not merely protect public safety—it is also 
instrumental in suppressing opposition to the CCP.177 This extends beyond 
the targeting of specific “threats” to the Party—i.e. political opposition—
and to initiatives, such as social credit scores, designed to ensure the loyalty 
of the general public.178 
However, it would be a mistake to dismiss comparisons between the 
surveillance tactics of law enforcement in the United States and China on 
the grounds that, whatever problems exist in the United States, genocide is 
not one of them. Facial recognition is used by law enforcement in the 
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United States to identify protestors, immigrants, and even journalists.179 
License plate readers track citizens in real time.180 Predictive policing 
initiatives in the United States, such as threat scores, bear a strong 
resemblance to similar initiatives in China.181 And all of this just scratches 
the surface. American law enforcement is focused on collecting as much 
data as it can, and then figuring out how to use it later.182 Undoubtedly, 
there are also surveillance initiatives in place that we have yet to learn 
about. 
These tools help law enforcement solve and deter crimes, though at the 
expense of individual privacy. It would also be a mistake, however, to 
ignore the impact of getting caught in the crosshairs simply because the 
stakes are not as high as in China.183 Perhaps it is a bargain Americans are 
willing to make.184 If so, we should be honest about the cost. 
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